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Abstract
This study analyzes Wal-Mart’s pricing practices and its inﬂuence
on competitors’ input cost transmission. Previous attempts to analyze
Wal-Mart’s pricing strategy in the United States have been limited by
the company’s refusal to provide scanner data to third party research
ﬁrms such as AC Nielsen. This is the ﬁrst study to observe Wal-Mart’s
prices over an extended period of time. Using weekly-store level price
data between 2001 and 2006 that government oﬃcials collected in 12
Mexican cities, I ﬁnd that Wal-Mart adjusts its prices 1/3-3 times
slower to wholesale price increases than other retailers and responds
5-7 times faster to wholesale price decreases than its competitors. This
evidence is robust to the comparison of Wal-Mart to other hypermar-
kets that oﬀer “every day low prices” and to potential endogeneity
of Wal-Mart’s location choices. All retailers respond asymmetrically
to wholesale cost changes. However, retailers other than Wal-Mart
respond twice as fast to wholesale price increases than to decreases,
while Wal-Mart behaves in the opposite way. I ﬁnd no evidence that
proximity to a Wal-Mart supercenter or the level of competition aﬀects
the speed of price adjustment of retailers.
∗I am extremely grateful to Severin Borenstein for advice and support. I also thank
Paul Gertler, Howard Shelanski, and Catherine Wolfram. Email: amartens@illinois.edu
11 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on the economy. Par-
ticularly, it is unclear what the corporation’s pricing strategy is and how it
inﬂuences its rivals’ prices. Anecdotal evidence abounds, but previous re-
search has not directly observed Wal-Mart’s prices due to its refusal since
July 2001 to allow third-party research ﬁrms such as ACNielsen and Infor-
mation Resources, Inc. to collect prices in its stores. My study overcomes
these data limitations by focusing on Mexico. Like in the U.S., Wal-Mart is
the largest rival and employer in that country. Mexico is the second largest
market for Wal-Mart after the United States.
This paper is part of a broader literature on price adjustment, which has been
developed in industrial organization and macroeconomics. Macroeconomists
are interested in price ﬂexibility because it is relevant for monetary policy
and business cycle ﬂuctuations. Keynesian and New-Keynesian models rely
on sticky prices. Previous research in industrial economics has focused on the
asymmetry of price adjustment. Peltzman (2000) ﬁnds that prices tend to
rise faster than they fall in several industries in response to cost changes. He
also studies one particular supermarket chain, Dominick’s, and does not ﬁnd
any asymmetries in price adjustments. Blinder et al. (1998) interview busi-
nesspeople in order to ﬁnd out what their reasons for slow price adjustments
are. The most common response (62 percent of all ﬁrms and 73 percent of
2retail ﬁrms) is that ﬁrms hold back on price changes, waiting for others to
change prices ﬁrst. Particularly, they state that they wait for their competi-
tors to raise prices ﬁrst, while they initiate price cuts. Empirical studies that
analyze the relationship between price ﬂexibility, competition, and price ad-
justment asymmetries are scarce. The main reason are data limitations. The
ideal dataset requires time series for identical goods, information on compe-
tition and wholesale costs, and store-level disaggregation. Related research
that focuses on multiple ﬁrms has centered on a few industries, notably gas
stations and ﬁnancial services.
This study analyzes Wal-Mart’s pricing strategy in response to wholesale
price changes and how it inﬂuences the price adjustment of other retailers.
I begin with a descriptive analysis of the frequency, size, and synchroniza-
tion of price changes at Wal-Mart and the retailers that compete with it.
I present evidence that overall regular prices are more stable at Wal-Mart,
although the frequency of price changes varies widely across products. I
also show that Wal-Mart’s price changes are of a smaller magnitude than
those of its competitors. Another ﬁnding is that retailers that are closer to a
Wal-Mart supercenter have a similar frequency of price changes as retailers
that are farther away. The main empirical analysis focuses on the charac-
terization of price adjustment speed at individual stores in response to cost
shocks. I ﬁnd that all retailers adjust their prices asymmetrically. Wal-Mart
adjusts faster to wholesale price decreases than to wholesale price increases,
3while this asymmetry is reversed for other retailers. Wal-Mart stores adjust
their prices 1/3-3 times slower to wholesale cost increases than other retailers
and 5-7 times faster to wholesale cost decreases than its competitors. This
is consistent with anecdotal evidence about Wal-Mart’s relationship with
its suppliers. Articles in the business press frequently state that Wal-Mart
uses its bargaining power to exert pricing pressure on its suppliers, opposing
ﬁercely to price increases and constantly demanding new price cuts, as the
following example illustrates.
The chief executive of a U.S. plastic-goods maker recently got the
shock of his life. He had asked Wal-Mart Stores Inc., his biggest
customer, to absorb a 5% to 7% price increase. The exec had
good reason for the hike: The cost of resin, a key raw material
in plastics, was going through the roof. Still, he didn’t expect
Wal-Mart, with its fearsome reputation for squeezing suppliers,
to go along with the increase. Yet Wal-Mart allowed the supplier
to lift its price for the ﬁrst time in a decade. So should rivals and
suppliers breathe a sigh of relief? A small one, perhaps, but only
that. While Wal-Mart will be a bit more ﬂexible in giving its
suppliers a break, it will continue squeezing costs on many prod-
ucts, especially those it orders directly from manufacturers. Says
Jay Fitzsimmons, Wal-Mart’s senior vice-president for ﬁnance:
“Prices will continue to go down, but not as fast.” Indeed, the
overall price on a typical basket of Wal-Mart goods is still likely
4to fall this year. It just won’t drop the 2.5% to 3% it did last
year. 1
I also study whether Wal-Mart’s proximity and the overall level of com-
petition inﬂuence the transmission of input price changes to retail prices.
Wal-Mart’s reputation for having the lowest prices could inﬂuence the signals
about industry-wide costs that consumers receive when Wal-Mart changes its
prices, and therefore inﬂuence competitors’ prices. I do not ﬁnd evidence for
a clear relationship between distance to the closest Wal-Mart supercenter,
competition, and the speed of input cost pass-through. I analyze whether
price elasticity proxied by demographic characteristics inﬂuences stores’ price
adjustment strategy and do not ﬁnd a clear relationship. The latter also
serves as a robustness check conﬁrming that Wal-Mart’s response to whole-
sale cost changes is not driven by its endogenous location choices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next, the theoretical and
empirical literature on price ﬂexibility and asymmetric price transmission is
discussed. In section three, the data are presented. Section four describes
Wal-Mart’s and its competitors’ pricing behavior. Section ﬁve studies Wal-
Mart’s input cost transmission and its eﬀect on its rivals’ price adjustment.
The last section concludes.
1Business Week, February 16th 2004
52 Literature on Price Adjustment
2.1 Theoretical Literature on Price Change
This paper is related to the theoretical literature that links price rigidity and
asymmetric price transmission of input prices to market structure. Akerlof
and Yellen (1985) argue that a monopoly faces lower forgone proﬁts if it
fails to adjust prices in response to a cost shock than a Bertrand duopolist.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1987) show that monopolies may be less likely to ad-
just prices in response to cost changes than ﬁrms in duopoly markets. Barro
(1972) predicts greater frequency of price changes in markets with more com-
petition because ﬁrms face more elastic demand. Levy (2007) reviews recent
theoretical developments on price rigidity and ﬂexibility. One of the most
popular theories states that prices adjust slowly to cost changes because it
is costly to change prices. Some proponents such as Rotemberg (1982) argue
that the price adjustment costs are convex in the price change and therefore
imply small price changes. Another view is that price changes imply a ﬁxed
cost every time, analogously to the cost of reprinting a menu. This “menu
cost theory” was proposed by Mankiw (1985). Another theory is based on
the idea that ﬁrms can use their inventories to buﬀer changes in prices. An
implication is that ﬁrms that have lower inventory costs should have stickier
prices. A coordination failure among ﬁrms could also lead to prices that ad-
just slowly to input cost changes. This idea implies that ﬁrms wait for their
rivals to raise their prices ﬁrst. In the absence of a price leader or collusive
6behavior, prices adjust slowly. This theory has been advanced by Cooper
and John (1988) and Ball and Romer (1991). Other explanations on price
rigidity include long-term contracts, pro-cyclical elasticity of demand, non-
price market clearing, imperfect information about product characteristics,
and on ﬁrms’ conduct.
Cabral and Fishman (2006) develop a search theoretical model which predicts
more frequent small price increases than small price decreases and more fre-
quent large price decreases than large price increases. The intuition is that
a price change by a consumer’s regular vendor conveys information about
industry-wide cost shocks if competing vendors’ production costs are posi-
tively correlated. If the regular vendor increases its price, the consumer will
interpret it as bad news about the entire industry and assume that competi-
tor’s prices have also increased. In the presence of search costs, a consumer
would accept a moderate price increase rather than search. Therefore, sell-
ers can increase prices moderately without losing consumers in response to
cost increases. In the case of a price reduction at one ﬁrm, consumers will
view it as “good news” about the entire industry because it carries the pos-
sibility of even greater price reductions at other ﬁrms. Hence, a moderate
price decrease could encourage customers to search elsewhere in the hope of
ﬁnding still greater bargains, which implies that a sellers’ optimal response
to moderate cost decreases is to keep prices unchanged. The same argument
applies to large cost changes. If prices decline by a lot, consumers know that
7it is unlikely that further search will reveal even lower prices. This implies
that large cost reductions can lead to large price reductions. Conversely, if
search costs are not too high, a large price increase could trigger consumer
search because there is the likelihood that competitors’ prices have risen by
substantially less. Therefore, large cost increases can result in only moder-
ate price increases. This model can be applied to the retail industry with
two assumptions. First, search costs will be higher the greater the distance
between retailers. Second, if consumers expect Wal-Mart to have the lowest
prices, this expectation should inﬂuence their search behavior depending on
where they observe a price change (at Wal-Mart or at competing retailers)
because a price change will convey diﬀerent information about industry-wide
costs.
A behavioral explanation for asymmetric prices is developed by Levy et al.
(2005). They ﬁnd support for more frequent small increases than small price
decreases, but do not ﬁnd any evidence for asymmetries with large price
changes. They analyze scanner price data that cover 27 product categories
over an eight-year period from Dominick’s supermarket. They ﬁnd that small
price increases occur more frequently than small price decreases for price
changes of up to about 10 cents, on average. To explain these ﬁndings, the
authors extend the implications of the literature on rational inattention to
individual price dynamics. Speciﬁcally, they argue that processing and re-
acting to price change information is a costly activity. Rational inattention
8implies that consumers may rationally choose to ignore and thus not to re-
spond to small price changes, creating a “range of inattention” along the
demand curve. This range of consumer inattention gives the retailers in-
centive for asymmetric price adjustment “in the small”. These incentives,
however, disappear for large price changes, because large price changes are
processed by consumers and therefore trigger their response.
2.2 Empirical literature on price changes
The empirical literature on the relationship between market structure and
price rigidity has found predominantly that the frequency of price adjust-
ments is lower in more concentrated markets. Hannan and Berger (1991)
ﬁnd that deposit interest rates at conventional banks are more rigid in con-
centrated markets. Carlton (1986) and Caucutt et al. (1999) also ﬁnd that
prices adjust more frequently if there is more competition. Arbatskaya and
Baye analyze daily mortgage rates that are posted online and the frequency
of price changes. They ﬁnd that price rigidity depends on market structure,
particularly that online mortgage rates are 30 to 40 percent more durable in
concentrated markets. They also ﬁnd downward price stickiness, rate adjust-
ments in response to cost increases are twice the adjustments in response to
cost decreases. Fisher and Konieczny (1995) ﬁnd an opposite result, prices
for monopolistic city newspapers are less rigid than the prices of oligopolistic
newspapers. Bils and Klenow (2004) analyze the frequency of price changes
for 350 categories of goods and services based on Bureau of Labor Statis-
9tics data from 1995 to 1997. They ﬁnd that goods sold in more competitive
markets, as measured by concentration ratios or wholesale markups, display
more frequent price changes. This result disappears when they control for a
good being energy related or being a fresh food.
Empirical literature that has tested the relationship between market power
and asymmetric price transmission is scarce. Neuman and Sharpe (1992)
ﬁnd that banks in concentrated markets tend to be slower to increase inter-
est rates on deposits in response to rising open market rates; and faster to
lower interest rates on deposits in response to falling market interest rates.
Borenstein et al. (1997) ﬁnd that retail gasoline prices respond more quickly
to increases than to decreases in crude oil. They analyze diﬀerent expla-
nations for this phenomenon and ﬁnd more support for short run market
power among retail gasoline sellers. Peltzman (2000) includes two prox-
ies for market power in his study across industries, with conﬂicting results.
Asymmetry increases as the number of competitors falls and asymmetry de-
creases with greater concentration measured as the Herﬁndahl- Hirschman
index. Axarloglou (2007) ﬁnds a positive relationship between competition
and synchronization of price adjustments using store-level transaction price
data for books and CDs collected in two cities. Mueller and Sourav (2007)
study Dominick’s supermarket chain’s scanner price data with a weekly fre-
quency and do not ﬁnd chain-wide asymmetric pricing. Weber and Anders
(2007) study the relationship between market power and price ﬂexibility in
10the retail markets for beef and pork from January 2000 to December 2001
in 207 retail outlets. They ﬁnd that discount stores have more rigid prices.
Owen and Trzepacz (2002) compare the pricing behavior of eight supermar-
kets across regions with and without item pricing laws, analyzing the impor-
tance of menu costs. They ﬁnd that item pricing laws matter only for the
ﬁrm which has an everyday low price strategy. The other ﬁrm in their study
follows a HiLo strategy with frequent promotions and its pricing behavior is
unaﬀected by the item pricing law. They also ﬁnd that market characteristics
such as age and income inﬂuenced the magnitude of price changes. Stores
in markets with higher average ages implemented smaller price changes and
stores in more aﬄuent areas implemented smaller downward price changes.
They study price changes in eight supermarkets that are part of two diﬀerent
chains in Upstate New York.
2.3 Literature on Wal-Mart and retail pricing
The following academic papers attempt to quantify Wal-Mart’s eﬀect on
prices. Basker (2005) studies prices before and after Wal-Mart’s entry, us-
ing quarterly average city prices for ten non-grocery goods in 165 U.S. cities
from 1982 to 2002 from the American Chamber of Commerce Research As-
sociation (ACCRA). These prices are collected during the ﬁrst week of every
quarter in 5-10 non-identiﬁed retail establishments. She ﬁnds that prices
are 12% lower after Wal-Mart’s entry. Basker and Noel (2007) estimate the
competitive price response to Wal-Mart’s entry using store-level price data
11from ACCRA for 24 grocery products for four weeks (the ﬁrst week of July
2001, July 2002, July 2003, and July 2004) in 175 U.S. cities. These data
include a maximum of 10 stores in each city and the mean number of stores
surveyed in each city is 5. Basker and Noel ﬁnd that after Wal-Mart’s entry,
competitors’ prices are 1-1.2% lower.
Hausman and Leibtag (2004) use AC Nielsen Consumer Panel data from
1998 to 2001 to estimate that supercenters’ food prices are 4.5% lower than
those of regular supermarkets. They do not focus particularly on Wal-Mart,
but on supercenters in general. They analyze the prices of twenty grocery
products2 in six cities3. Research that analyzes the eﬀect of Wal-mart’s entry
on price levels has to take into account that there is endogeneity in the entry
decisions of Wal-Mart.
Empirical research on retail pricing across stores is limited. This is mainly
due to data limitations. Scanner data have been used to study consumer
choices, but not inter-store competition. Ellickson and Misra (2006) focus
on retail stores’ general pricing strategies, as they choose between featuring
every day low prices (EDLP) or promotions. Their data are a survey that
store managers answered in 1998 regarding their pricing strategies.
2apples, apple juice, bananas, bread, butter, cereal, chicken breast, coﬀee, cookies, eggs,
ground beef, ham, ice cream, lettuce, milk, potatoes, soda, tomatoes, bottled water, and
yogurt
3Atlanta, Baltimore/Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Antonio
123 Data
3.1 Price Data
This study uses weekly store-level prices for 46 branded products from Jan-
uary 2001 to June 2006, collected by the Mexican Consumer Protection
Agency. The data cover twelve cities: Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey,
Morelia, Merida, Oaxaca, Puebla, Queretaro, Tijuana, Toluca, Veracruz, and
Villahermosa. Mexico City is a huge metropolitan area –19,331,365 people
live in the Mexico City Meteropolitan Zone according to the 2005 Mexican
Census– so that it actually corresponds to several cities. The maximum
number of stores (it is an unbalanced panel) in the dataset is 646 in Mexico
City, 44 in Morelia, 55 in Monterrey, 22 in Merida, 61 in Guadalajara, 29 in
Oaxaca, 50 in Puebla, 44 in Queretaro, 60 in Tijuana, 29 in Toluca, 45 in Ve-
racruz, and 31 in Villahermosa. The retail stores include international chains
such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, Mexican national chains, local chains, pub-
lic chains, and independent stores. Two cities in the dataset do not have a
Wal-Mart supercenter: Tijuana4 and Oaxaca.
The goods are narrowly deﬁned by packaging and brand and include gro-
ceries and drugstore products. A detailed list of the products is presented in
table 1. Price data correspond to regular prices and are collected by Mexi-
can public employees. The price collectors are advised to collect only regular
4Wal-Mart opened a supercenter in Tijuana on October 27th, 2006
13prices, i.e. if the price tag on a shelf displays the regular price in black let-
ters and the promotional price in red letters, the black price is registered.
Therefore, this paper focuses on the change of regular prices, which are the
everyday prices for retailers who engage in “Every day low pricing” and are
the high prices for retailers who choose a high-low pricing strategy. The
implications of focusing on regular prices will be further discussed.
3.2 Competition data
I measure competition in terms of the number of stores in a particular radius.
In order to compute the number of stores, I use a yearly registry of all stores in
Mexico, which includes their opening date. A law was passed in December
1996 which requires all businesses to register. Businesses are required to
update their registration every year, facing a ﬁne if they fail to do so. If a
business closes, changes its address or its activities, it has to inform of such
changes within two months. I use the registry data of the activity code which
corresponds to “Retail commerce in supermarkets and self-service stores”.
Unfortunately, the registry is not that clean (some unrelated companies are
listed under that category), so that I further restrict the stores to the ones
that have the words “auto” (self-service) and/or “super” in their business
description. The retailing literature measures competition in terms of a trade
area, which is the geographic area from which a particular store draws its
customers, based on travel time to store and store size. There are diﬀerent
rules of thumb to measure these trade areas. Given the subjective nature
14of any deﬁnition, I will try diﬀerent speciﬁcations. First of all, I geocode
all retail store addresses. I do this based on the zip code centroid of each
retail store’s zipcode. Second, I deﬁne a local market based on the distance
between diﬀerent stores. Previous approaches have used a 7-mile radius for
the United States5. I use diﬀerent radii: 1-mile and 3-miles. These radii
are more appropriate for the Mexican context because fewer people own cars
than in the United States and because of greater vehicular congestion. I then
measure local competition in terms of the number of stores in a particular
radius. The results are invariant to both measures, so that I discuss the
implications of the number of competitors in a 3-mile radius in the empirical
section. I also measure the distance to the nearest Wal-Mart supercenter for
each store.
3.3 Demographic data
I use demographic data at the locality level from the 2005 Census in Mexico
(“Conteo de Poblacion y Vivienda”, INEGI). These data include information
on household age and gender composition; goods that households own (re-
frigerator, TV, washing machine, and computer); educational background;
information about public health and social beneﬁts; and a description of the
housing unit.
5Orhun(2006)
153.4 Wholesale cost data
I obtain wholesale prices from the Mexican Ministry of Economy, which col-
lects daily prices in 45 wholesale markets across Mexico. These wholesale
markets (centrales de abasto) supply convenience stores, supermarkets (de-
ﬁned as stores with 350 to 4000 square meters with at least three cash regis-
ters), kiosks, and traditional fairs. The Central de Abastos from Ciudad de
Mexico operates approximately 40 percent6 of the market for fruits, vegeta-
bles, grains, oil, ﬁsh, and meat.7
4 Description of Pricing Behavior
This section describes the frequency, size, and synchronization of price changes
at Wal-Mart stores and other retailers.
4.1 Do chains engage in uniform pricing?
The data contain several chain stores. A critical aspect for my empirical
strategy is how retail chains take pricing decisions for their stores, particu-
larly whether pricing decisions are being taken uniformly at the central oﬃce
or locally by store managers. If there is an uniform pricing rule for a chain
across stores and cities, distance to Wal-Mart or the level of competition
6Salcido (2003)“La Comercializacion de Alimentos en la Central de Abastos de Ciudad
de Mexico”
7I also collect futures prices for Milk Class IV and Basic Formula Price (BFP) Milk
from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
16will not matter. There is little evidence for a uniform pricing rule in the
retail literature. Hoch et al. (1995) analyze how demographic variables and
competitive environment inﬂuence price elasticities across 83 stores of Do-
minick’s in the Chicago area. They recommend that Dominick’s reﬁne its
(regular) pricing strategy of three pricing zones. The zones are described
as “The three DFF pricing zones are deﬁned almost entirely by the extent
of nearby competition. The lowest price zone is a warehouse-ﬁghter zone,
which is aimed at achieving closer parity to large EDLP warehouse opera-
tions.” They ﬁnd that 67% of store price elasticities can be explained by
eleven variables, which are mainly demographic, and hence recommend local
pricing that focuses more on demographic characteristics.
In order to analyze how prices vary across stores of a particular chain, I
compute the coeﬃcient of variation of prices across stores within a chain
for each of the products in each of the weeks. The coeﬃcient of variation
is deﬁned as the standard deviation divided by the mean, and hence allows
comparison across goods. Summary statistics of the coeﬃcients of variation
of prices across stores for each product are presented in table 2. There is
evidence against uniform pricing across stores of a particular chain and the
coeﬃcient of variation of prices across stores of a chain varies widely by prod-
uct. The mean coeﬃcient of variation across weeks and products is 4.04%.
For Wal-Mart, the mean coeﬃcient of variation across time and goods is
3.93%. I also study the share of stores that charges the modal price in each
17chain (see table 3). The average proportion of stores that charges the chain’s
modal price is 43.84%. This share is lowest for tuna (39.2%) and highest
for vinegar (51.9%). These results provide evidence for non-uniform pricing
within a chain and therefore justify analyzing how store-speciﬁc competition
and demographics aﬀect pricing strategies.
4.2 Are Regular Prices Lower At Wal-Mart?
It is commonly believed that Wal-Mart oﬀers the lowest prices. I compare
prices for all the goods, computing the store-level percentile rank for the
price of each product in a given week and city. Wal-Mart’s average per-
centile rank across weeks, stores, and products is 37.1%. Summary statistics
for Wal-Mart’s price percentile ranks are presented in table 4. Wal-Mart’s
prices are lower than the average, but are not consistently the lowest prices.
The relatively cheapest product at Wal-Mart (out of the database) is ultra-
pasteurized milk (percentile rank of 14%), and the relatively more expensive
goods are napkins (percentile rank of 57%). This price dispersion at Wal-
Mart stores implies that consumers who like shopping there, should still have
incentives to search for low prices at other stores if the search costs are not
excessive. Search costs will be lower the closer retailers are geographically,
and hence, price competition (and adjustment) could be aﬀected by the num-
ber of competitors in a given radius and the distance to the closest Wal-Mart
supercenter.
184.3 How does the Frequency and Size of Price Changes
at Wal-Mart Compare to other Retailers?
I study the stability of regular prices using survival analysis, deﬁning “fail-
ures” in terms of price changes. A product-by-product analysis using the
Cox proportional hazards model reveals that the regular prices of some goods
change faster at Wal-Mart than at other retailers, while the prices of some
goods change slower.8 I test the following speciﬁcations for the hazard rate
of the price change of product i in store j of ﬁrm k.
h(t|xijk) = h0(t)exp(xijkβx) (1)
The hazard rate for the jth store is
h(t|xijk) = h0(t)exp(xijkβx) (2)
where x is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the store is a Wal-Mart
supercenter. The interpretation of the coeﬃcients is the ratio of the hazards
for a one-unit change in the corresponding covariate. Anecdotes about Wal-
Mart’s pricing behavior include that it tends to oppose suppliers’ proposals
of price increases. The book “The Wal-Mart Eﬀect” tells how the executives
of Bertolli Olive Oil attempted a price raise when the Euro exchange rate in-
8The Kaplan-Meier estimate for all pooled products shows that Wal-Mart’s prices have
a better “survival experience” than the prices from other stores, and hence that regular
prices change slower at Wal-Mart. This also holds for a separate analysis of price increases
and price decreases.
19creased and it was a bad crop year for olive oil. Wal-Mart did not approve the
price increase in spite of these cost increases. Other stories about Wal-Mart
state that it requires its suppliers to oﬀer a price cut every year. In order
to analyze preliminarily whether there is any evidence for this asymmetric
pricing behavior, I estimate the hazard ratio of a price increase and a price
decrease separately. I therefore analyze the hazard ratio of a price change,
a price increase, and a price decrease. Pooled across all goods, the hazard
of a price increase is 3.1% lower at Wal-Mart than at the other stores, while
the hazard of a price decrease is 7.7% lower at Wal-Mart. The results for all
product-by-product Cox estimations are presented in tables 5 and 6. Most
products (69.56%)have a lower hazard of a price change at Wal-Mart than at
the other stores. The hazard of a price decrease is greater than the hazard
of a price decrease for 73.91% of the products.
In order to analyze the size of price changes, I compute their absolute value in
monetary terms (Mexican peso) for Wal-Mart stores and other stores. Sum-
mary statistics are presented in table 7. The average size of price changes is
lower at Wal-Mart for each of the products. Therefore, a preliminary analysis
shows that Wal-Mart changes its regular prices less frequently and that the
price changes correspond to a lower monetary amount than those of other
retailers. This suggests that Wal-Mart might not track wholesale prices that
closely. I will analyze price adjustment in response to changes in wholesale
costs in depth in section 5.
204.4 How is Proximity to Wal-Mart related to Price
Changes?
I analyze how time until a price increase and decrease varies with the distance
to the closest Wal-Mart and the number of competitors in a 3-mile radius
(which include Wal-Mart) for stores in Mexico City. The analysis uses Cox
proportional hazards model, which models the hazard rate for a price change
of product i in store j of ﬁrm k is:
h(t|xijk) = h0(t)exp(xijkβx) (3)
where x measures proximity to Wal-Mart of a particular store. A propor-
tional Cox regression shows that increasing the distance to the closest Wal-
Mart by a mile increases a store’s hazard of a price increase or a price de-
crease by 0.001%. This outcome suggests that an endogenous location choice
by Wal-Mart is not so likely. If this were the case, distance to Wal-Mart
would proxy for other unobservable characteristics which inﬂuence stores’
decisions to change their prices. I will include competition indicators and
demographic variables to account for this in the next section. A modiﬁed
Cox proportional hazards model includes both the minimum distance to a
Wal-Mart supercenter and the number of competitors in the covariates x.
As table 8 shows, one additional competitor in a 3-mile ratio decreases the
hazard of a price decrease and the hazard of a price increase of a non-Wal-
Mart retailer by 0.001%. Increasing the distance to the closest Wal-Mart by
21a mile increases the hazard of a price increase or a price decrease by the same
amount.
5 Input-Output Transmission
This section analyzes how Wal-Mart adjusts its prices to input cost changes
and how Wal-Mart’s strategy aﬀects the pass-through of other retailers.
Anecdotal evidence states that Wal-Mart is continuously monitoring its sup-
pliers’ costs, demanding price cuts, and ﬁercely opposing price increases as
the following example shows.
One multinational supplier, who asked to remain anonymous,
says Wal-Mart buyers in Mexico were “aggressive and abusive”,
pulling his product oﬀ shelves for several months last year when
he objected to a deep price cut that would have wiped out his
proﬁts. Meanwhile, Danone yogurt disappeared from Wal-Mart’s
Mexican stores for several months in 2001. Suppliers and retail
buyers say the French company had participated in a weekend
sales promotion at a competing supermarket, but balked when
Wal-Mart buyers demanded the same discount on a permanent
basis. ... Eduardo Castro, president and chief operating oﬃcer of
Wal-Mart de Mxico, says he cannot comment on speciﬁc cases,
but he defends his company’s tactics down to the last candy bar.
“If we stop doing business with a supplier, it’s because his costs
22don’t allow him to sell at the prices we’ve established,” Castro
says. “The few cases I know about [involve] price increases that
they haven’t been able to justify.”9
There is no prior systematic evidence of Wal-Mart’s relationship with
suppliers, given the secrecy that Wal-Mart is said to impose on them and the
lack of price and wholesale data. This section estimates the pass-through of
input costs to ﬁnal prices at Wal-Mart stores and the competitive impact on
other retailers. In order to estimate this, the ideal goods would exhibit large
and frequent cost ﬂuctuations and have a short shelf life. The products in the
database with the shortest shelf-life are yoghurt, pasteurized milk, tortillas,
and bread. An additional consideration for the ideal products are data avail-
ability of wholesale costs. The Mexican government collects daily price data
with detailed product speciﬁcations in 45 wholesale markets for horticultural
raw and processed goods, meat, and ﬁsh. Out of these goods, three products
with the exact speciﬁcations in terms of brand and size are in my database:
corn oil (1-liter bottle of “La Gloria”), mixed vegetable oil (1-liter bottle
of “1-2-3”), and tuna in oil (174 gram can of “Dolores”). Although these
goods are not perfect because they do not have the short shelf life mentioned
above, they are still relevant because retailers try to optimize their invento-
ries and minimize storage costs. The choice of these products understates
the eﬀect for perishable goods. The wholesale prices are collected for a box
of 12 bottles of corn oil, a box of 12 bottles of vegetable mixed oil, and a
9Business Week, September 16th 2002
23box of 48 tuna cans. The wholesale prices of mixed vegetable oil and corn
oil are available on a weekly frequency and the wholesale prices of tuna in
oil are collected twice a month. As already described, the wholesale markets
(“centrales de abasto”) in which the prices are collected supply convenience
stores, supermarkets, and kiosks. Therefore, these wholesale prices are an
approximation of the true economic marginal cost rather than an account-
ing measure that is driven by the retailers’ inventory policies. Nevo and
Hatzitaskos (2005) comment on the poor quality of the wholesale prices of
Dominick’s supermarket chain’s database because they correspond to an av-
erage acquisition cost. Both Peltzman (2000) and Mueller and Ray (2007)
use those data to study whether there are asymmetries in price adjustment.
Neither Dominick’s self-reported wholesale costs nor the wholesale costs that
I use account for agreements between manufacturers and retailers such as
coupons, so that the actual wholesale costs that the retailers face might be
lower.
In addition to the wholesale prices described above, I collect milk futures
prices from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to proxy for wholesale prices
of pasteurized milk and yoghurt. I use the Milk Class IV and Basic Formula
Price (BFP) milk prices.
I ask the following questions. How does the price of a one liter corn oil
bottle at a speciﬁc store respond to a change in corn oil’s wholesale price? Is
the response asymmetric for corn oil wholesale price increases and decreases?
24Is price adjustment to input costs shocks diﬀerent at Wal-Mart than at other
stores? How do retailers’ responses to cost shocks depend on proximity to
Wal-Mart, overall competition, and consumer characteristics?
The empirical speciﬁcations used in prior research on price adjustment




it = α + β1p
who
t + ηxit + δt + µt (4)
where pret
it is the retail price in store i in week t, pwho
t is the wholesale price
in week t, xit is a vector of store ﬁxed eﬀects, and t is a time trend (week
number). This equation can be regarded as an estimate of the long-run equi-
librium relationship between retail and wholesale prices. The coeﬃcients for
equation 5 for each of the products are reported in table 9. Vegetable mixed
oil has the best ﬁt, the retail price is explained by 93.7% of the wholesale
price. A coeﬃcient of 1 would be expected in the long run if it were exactly
the same product and if retailing exhibited constant returns to scale and were
perfectly competitive.10
10The estimated relationship between dairy retail and wholesale prices from this equa-
tion is very low (below 5%). This could be due to two factors. First, milk futures prices
are a rough measure of yoghurt and ultrapasteurized milk because they refer to a diﬀerent
physical product. Second, milk futures prices trade in much greater units than the retail
dairy products. Unfortunately, the Mexican government only began collecting wholesale
prices for milk in 2007. Therefore, I exclude dairy products from my analysis.
25Second, a lagged adjustment model, an error correction model, or a com-
bination of both is estimated. The combined model has the following form:
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t−1 for store i in week t, D+ and D− are dummy
variables with: D+ = 1 if pwho
t ≥ pwho
t−1 and D+ = 0 otherwise; D− = 1 if
pwho
t < pwho
t−1 and D− = 0 otherwise. The error correction term ECTt−1 is the
one-period lagged residual from equation 5.
For the three products that I focus on (corn oil, vegetable mixed oil,
and tuna in oil) the error correction term is so strong that it wipes out the
eﬀect of the lagged adjustment coeﬃcients (see table 10). The following error
correction model does not contain the lagged terms:
∆p
ret
it = α + φECTt−1 + δt (6)
The ﬁt for this model is presented in table 11. In order to be able to test
whether there are any asymmetries in price adjustment, I diﬀerentiate among
26positive and negative values of the error correction term.
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where ECT + and ECT − are positive and negative deviations from the long-
run equilibrium respectively. The interpretation of the coeﬃcients is as fol-
lows. A positive value of the error correction term implies that the observed
retail price is higher than the equilibrium retail price that is determined by
the wholesale price. Therefore, a positive value of the error correction term
means that the retail price would be expected to adjust downwards. A neg-
ative value of the error correction term has the opposite interpretation, it
implies that retail prices would be expected to increase. The expected sign
for the coeﬃcient of both positive and negative values of the error correction
terms is negative, as it implies a stable price relationship.
In order to analyze whether Wal-Mart stores adjust their prices to wholesale

















where W is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for Wal-Mart stores.
The results of this speciﬁcation are presented in table 13. The errors are
clustered by time, speciﬁcally by week. Both Wal-Mart stores and non-Wal-
27Mart stores respond asymmetrically to wholesale price changes, but with the
opposite sign. Wal-Mart stores adjust their prices faster to wholesale price
decreases than to wholesale price increases, while this relationship is reversed
for non-Wal-Mart stores. Analyzing overall price adjustment without taking
asymmetries into account confounds the results (table 12), as overall prices
for corn oil adjust faster at Wal-Mart and prices of tuna adjust slower. As
table 13 shows, at non-Wal-Mart stores the retail price of mixed vegetable oil
adjusts upward by almost double the percentage of the error correction term
that it adjusts downward in one week (24% versus 13%). For corn oil, this
diﬀerence is even larger (17% versus 7%). Regarding tuna, the coeﬃcient
for an upward price adjustment of non-Wal-Mart stores is not statistically
signiﬁcant, and the price adjusts downward by 20% of the error correction
term in one week. At Wal-Mart stores, the price of mixed vegetable oil ad-
justs downward almost seven times faster in one week than at other retailers
and it adjusts upward one third slower than at other retailers. The price of
corn oil adjusts downward more than ﬁve times faster at Wal-Mart stores
than at other retailers and the interaction eﬀect for the upward adjustment
coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant. The price of tuna adjusts three
times slower upward at Wal-Mart stores and the coeﬃcient for the down-
ward interaction eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. Summarizing, all three
coeﬃcients on Wal-Mart’s positive interaction term are negative, suggesting
faster downward price adjustment at Wal-Mart stores. The two coeﬃcients
on Wal-Mart’s negative interaction term that are statistically signiﬁcant are
28positive, suggesting that prices at Wal-Mart stores adjust slower upwards.
The following analysis centers on whether Wal-Mart inﬂuences other re-
tailers’ price adjustment speed. The coordination failure hypothesis states
that prices adjust slowly because ﬁrms wait for other ﬁrms to initiate price
changes. This failure could be alleviated by a price leader or by collusive
behavior. Wal-Mart seems to be a good candidate for a price leader given its
size and reputation. Other models state that if search costs are not exces-
sive, consumers will shop around if their regular retailer changes its prices.
Wal-Mart’s reputation for squeezing suppliers and passing all savings on to
their consumers could lead consumers to think that they will infer whether
costs have changed industry-wide by comparing prices at Wal-Mart super-
centers. Search costs should be lower the closer a Wal-Mart supercenter to
consumers’ regular store is. The speciﬁcation below analyzes the inﬂuence

















where mindist measures the distance for each store to the closest Wal-Mart
supercenter. Stores that are one mile closer to a Wal-Mart supercenter adjust
their corn oil prices 0.9% faster downward and 0.4% slower upward. Retailers
that are one mile closer to a Wal-Mart store adjust their vegetable oil prices
0.4% slower downward. Hence, I do not ﬁnd a clear relationship between
29proximity to Wal-Mart and the speed of price adjustment.
Firms’ incentives to rapidly adjust prices could also depend on the level
of competition. Search costs for lower prices depend on travel costs between
stores. Hence, I measure competition as the number of stores in a 3-mile
radius11. The number of stores includes Wal-Mart supercenters. The follow-


















where compi is the number of competitors for store i in a 3-mile radius.
The results for this speciﬁcation are presented in table 15. Stores with an
additional competitor within 3 miles adjust their corn oil prices 0.2% slower
downward and 0.1% slower upward. Retailers with an additional competitor
in a 3-mile radius adjust the price of mixed vegetable oil 0.1% faster upward.
The other coeﬃcients are neither statistically nor economically signiﬁcant.
Therefore, I do not ﬁnd support for theories that link the speed of price
adjustment to the level of competition.
11An alternative speciﬁcation with a 1-mile radius has similar results.
305.1 Discussion
This section reviews how robust the aforementioned results are. First, con-
cern could arise because retailers follow diﬀerent pricing strategies, using
either an “every day low prices” or a “high-low prices” approach. The data
contain list regular prices, so that the low promotional prices are excluded.
In order to analyze the robustness of the results, I study whether Wal-Mart’s
pricing strategy is diﬀerent from that of other every day low price retailers,
restricting the sample to hypercenters. The results are robust to this speci-
ﬁcation (see table 16), Wal-Mart stores adjust their prices downward faster
than other supercenters and adjust their prices upward slower than other hy-
percenters in response to wholesale cost changes. Other supercenters exhibit
a reverse asymmetry in price adjustment for corn oil and vegetable oil than
Wal-Mart, adjusting their prices faster upward than downward.
A second empirical challenge is that retailers engage in multi-product pric-
ing. Ideally, I would like to study a representative basket of goods. There
is multi-market contact in terms of the product market and the geographic
market. Price changes across each chain’s stores and price changes across
product categories are not independent. I study isolated goods instead of
focusing on a basket of representative goods or an entire product category.
A related concern is which products are staple goods for consumers of a
particular market. The question arises whether the products that I use for
the input cost transmission analysis are goods for which demand elastic-
31ity is average and whether it varies across consumers’ characteristics. The
description of pricing practices in section four illustrates that those partic-
ular products change their prices with an approximately average frequency
and that they tend to have a price distribution at Wal-Mart stores that is
close to the average. In addition, it is not obvious that those products are
consumed in a greater proportion by households with certain demographic
characteristics, as would have been the case if for example baby food had
been included in the analysis. I analyze the inﬂuence of demographic charac-
teristics on price adjustment in order to address this concern and to account
for potential endogeneity of Wal-Mart’s locations. If Wal-Mart’s stores are
located in areas where people who buy corn oil, vegetable oil, and tuna have
a diﬀerent price elasticity than consumers from other neighborhoods, the
results about Wal-Mart’s input cost transmission would be confounded. Us-
ing demographic data at the locality level for Mexico City, I study whether
stores’ price adjustment is driven by consumer characteristics. Hoch et al.
(1995) ﬁnd that households with higher income are less price sensitive. In
order to proxy for income diﬀerences, I include an interaction eﬀect in the
error correction model that measures the proportion of households in each
store’s neighborhood that owns a refrigerator and a personal computer. In
addition to proxying for income, a higher proportion of refrigerators could
indicate higher search costs for consumers. Analogous to Sorenson’s (2002)
who studies how frequency of purchase inﬂuences pharmaceuticals’ price dis-
persion, frequency of grocery shopping will depend on storage capabilities
32by households, which are determined by the ownership of a refrigerator and
storage space. Singh et al. (2006) show that households with an infant (or
a pet) are more likely to shop at Wal-Mart stores. I include an interaction
term that accounts for the proportion of households with small children (up
to four years old) in each store’s neighborhood. The results are presented in
table 17. There is not a strong pattern of statistical consistency for any of
the three demographic variables. However, all six of the coeﬃcient estimates
are negative, and one is signiﬁcant, for refrigerator ownership, suggesting
faster price adjustment (both upwards and downwards) when a greater share
of the population owns a refrigerator. Five of the six coeﬃcient estimates
are negative, and two are signiﬁcant, for percentage of households with small
children, also suggesting faster price adjustment in both directions for stores
that are located in neighborhoods with more small children. Demographic
characteristics do not account for the asymmetric response to wholesale price
cost changes that Wal-Mart stores exhibit. Hence, there is no evidence that
the results of Wal-Mart’s input-cost transmission are driven by its endoge-
nous location choices.
6 Conclusion
How should the ﬁndings that Wal-Mart adjusts its prices faster downward
than its competitors and slower upward than its rivals be interpreted? The
classical discussion about Wal-Mart is summarized in the following article
33from the New York Times on Mexican retailers.
According to Carlos N. Lukac, managing director of the Mexico
City oﬃce of the Bain and Company consulting ﬁrm: About 3
percentage points of Wal-Mart’s price advantage comes from its
negotiations with suppliers, he said, adding that Wal-Mart’s “dis-
tribution costs are more eﬃcient by orders of magnitude.” “I am
fed up with hearing about Wal-Mart’s eﬃciencies and logistics,”
said Santiago Garca, president of Comercial Mexicana’s hyper-
market group, pointing to numbers on Wal-Mart’s balance sheet
to show where the two companies’ operating costs are compara-
ble. “The reality is that their eﬃciency is in the volumes they
have and the way they squeeze suppliers.”12
Wal-Mart has been credited for having more eﬃcient distribution systems
than other retailers, which would imply less inventories. Therefore, it would
be expected to have less sticky prices, but overall (without taking asym-
mmetries into account) Wal-Mart does not adjust its prices faster than its
competitors as shown in table 12. The ﬁndings of an asymmetry in the speed
of price adjustment towards lower prices is consistent with anecdotal evidence
of Wal-Mart taking advantage of its scale when bargaining with suppliers.
An alternative explanation is that Wal-Mart passes all savings on to its con-
sumers through an every-day-low pricing strategy, rather than temporal price
12“Mexican retailers unite against Wal-Mart”, New York Times, July 9, 2004
34promotions. In order to test this eﬀect, I restrict the analysis to all every-
day-low-price retailers. Wal-Mart adjusts its prices faster downward than
other hypermarkets and slower upward than they do. Another alternative
explanation is that Wal-Mart’s contracts with suppliers have diﬀerent length
than those of other retailers, but this would not account for the asymmetry
in Wal-Mart’s response to wholesale cost changes.
To summarize, this study is the ﬁrst to directly observe Wal-Mart’s pric-
ing practices and its inﬂuence on other retailers’ input cost transmission over
an extended period of time. I analyze the importance of market power and
competition on the speed of input cost transmission using weekly store-level
retail prices in 12 Mexican cities from 2001 to 2006. Although this study
focuses on a small number of goods, it uses economically relevant wholesale
cost data, which are a better estimate of the true replacement cost than
self-reported wholesale costs by retailers that have been used in previous
research. The overall ﬁndings are that Wal-Mart adjusts its prices 1/3-3
times slower to wholesale price increases than other retailers and responds
5-7 times faster to wholesale price decreases than its competitors. This evi-
dence is robust to the comparison of Wal-Mart to other hypermarkets that
oﬀer “every day low prices”. Demographic variables in stores’ neighborhoods
which proxy for income and propensity for shopping at Wal-Mart do not ex-
plain Wal-Mart’s asymmetric price response, although prices tend to adjust
faster in both directions in stores that are located in neighborhoods with
35more refrigerators and more small children. The results therefore support
anecdotal evidence that Wal-Mart exerts pricing pressure on its suppliers.
All retailers respond asymmetrically to wholesale cost changes. However, re-
tailers other than Wal-Mart respond twice as fast to wholesale price increases
than to decreases, while Wal-Mart behaves in the opposite way. I do not ﬁnd
support for theoretical models that link search costs and market structure to
the speed of price adjustment. Neither proximity to a Wal-Mart supercenter
nor the number of competitors in a 3-mile radius aﬀect the speed of price
adjustment of retailers.
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41Table 1: List of products
Good Brand Packaging and Speciﬁcation
Corn Flour Maseca 1 kg. package
Corn Tortilla Milpa Real 500 gr. bag
Bread Bimbo 680 gr. package (white sliced bread)
Bread Wonder 680 gr. package (white sliced bread)
Cookies Gamesa 1kg. box (marias)
Pasta for Soup La Moderna 200 gr. package (long pasta)
Sugar Cereal (Zucaritas) Kellogg’s 510 gr. box
Evaporated Milk Carnation (Nestle) 410 gr. can (part skim)
Condensed Milk La Lechera (Nestle) 100 gr. can
Yoghurt Yoplait 150 gr. cup (strawberry)
Pasteurized Milk Alpura 2000 1 lt. box (part skim)
Corn Oil La Gloria 1 lt. bottle
Mixed Vegetable Oil 1-2-3 1 lt. bottle
Canola Oil Capullo 1 lt. bottle
Lard Inca 1 kg. package
Tuna Dolores 174 gr. can (in oil)
Peaches La Costena 820 gr. can (halves)
Corn Del Monte 225 gr. can (grain)
Chiles La Costena 220 gr. can (red jalapenos)
Tomato Puree Del Fuerte 1 kg. box
Peas Del Fuerte 225 gr. can
Baby Food Gerber 113 gr. jar (2nd stage, blended food)
Jam Mc Cormick 270 gr. jar (strawberry)
Sugar S/M 2 kg. plastic bag (brown)
Instant Coﬀee Nescafe Dolca 100 gr. jar
Instant Coﬀee Nescafe Dolca 200 gr. jar
Salt La Fina 1 kg. bag
Salt La Fina 1kg. container
English Sauce Worcestershire Crosse 145 ml. bottle
Hot Sauce Bufalo 150 gr. bottle (classic)
Vinegar Clemente Jacques 1 lt. bottle (white)
Cocoa Choco Milk 400 gr. bag
Cocoa Choco Milk 400 gr. can
Chocolate Abuelita 540 gr. package (6 tablets)
Bleach Cloralex 950 ml bottle
Laundry Detergent Foca 1 kg. bag (powder)
Soap Zote 400 gr. bar
Floor Cleaner Maestro Limpio 1 lt. bottle (multi-use pine)
Floor Cleaner Pinol 1 lt. bottle (multi-use pine)
Laundry Softener Vel Rosita 1 lt. bottle (liquid)
Hand Cream Hinds 420 ml. bottle (normal skin)
Deodorant Mum 65 ml. roll-on
Facial Soap Zest 150 gr. bar
Shampoo Caprice Naturals 900 ml. bottle
Napkins LYS 250 units package
Napkins Petalo 250 units package
42Table 2: Chains do not engage in uniform pricing: Summary statistics for
coeﬃcient of variation within a chain for each product’s price every week
Good Mean Coeﬀ. of Variation Std.Dev. N
Corn ﬂour 0.041 0.051 85,519
Tortilla 0.027 0.040 74,996
Bread (Bimbo) 0.027 0.023 101,462
Bread (Wonder) 0.035 0.036 74,876
Pasta for soup 0.049 0.055 109,419
Cookies 0.043 0.037 83,203
Sugar cereal 0.031 0.030 87,260
Tuna 0.048 0.053 73,154
Evaporated milk 0.032 0.051 91,370
Condensed milk 0.032 0.054 84,042
Yoghurt 0.050 0.048 93,840
Pasteurized milk 0.036 0.150 103,458
Corn oil 0.037 0.036 82,346
Mixed oil 0.035 0.029 100,979
Canola oil 0.036 0.029 115,879
Lard 0.038 0.046 88,623
Corn 0.043 0.044 86,896
Chiles 0.071 0.058 110,483
Tomato puree 0.040 0.052 81,205
Peas 0.072 0.083 87,667
Baby food 0.041 0.049 110,028
Jam 0.040 0.042 96,626
Peaches 0.040 0.036 78,546
Sugar 0.025 0.035 73,199
Instant coﬀee 0.021 0.028 100,367
Instant coﬀee 0.018 0.022 98,908
Salt 0.058 0.059 85,904
Salt 0.039 0.045 82,062
Worcestershire sauce 0.033 0.042 70,645
Hot sauce 0.037 0.056 91,763
Vinegar 0.023 0.039 73,061
Cocoa 0.047 0.045 92,543
Cocoa 0.041 0.034 95,795
Chocolate 0.043 0.035 96,754
Bleach 0.057 0.059 108,168
Laundry detergent 0.033 0.038 103,970
Soap 0.040 0.040 108,181
Floor cleaner 0.041 0.037 95,217
Floor cleaner 0.053 0.042 109,386
Laundry softener 0.034 0.034 97,082
Hand cream 0.037 0.037 72,235
Deodorant 0.051 0.049 82,647
Facial soap 0.035 0.035 88,454
Shampoo 0.041 0.038 95,869
Napkins 0.040 0.043 65,550
Napkins 0.041 0.039 88,402
43Table 3: Chains do not engage in uniform pricing: Summary statistics for
share of stores within a chain that charge the chain’s modal price
Good Mean Share Std.Dev. N
of Modal Price
Corn ﬂour 0.441 0.292 82,707
Tortilla 0.474 0.283 70,247
Bread (Bimbo) 0.453 0.286 93,827
Bread (Wonder) 0.461 0.289 68,332
Pasta for soup 0.425 0.282 104,236
Cookies 0.408 0.281 78,027
Sugar cereal 0.444 0.287 82,083
Tuna 0.392 0.292 68,719
Evaporated milk 0.434 0.293 89,014
Condensed milk 0.473 0.296 79,472
Yoghurt 0.426 0.273 88,651
Pasteurized milk 0.462 0.279 98,694
Corn oil 0.438 0.277 73,024
Mixed oil 0.394 0.293 92,895
Canola oil 0.401 0.294 106,749
Lard 0.459 0.291 83,973
Corn 0.453 0.284 81,281
Chiles 0.399 0.280 105,185
Tomato puree 0.451 0.284 75,710
Peas 0.476 0.282 81,835
Baby food 0.409 0.280 104,699
Jam 0.440 0.299 91,413
Peaches 0.414 0.271 72,632
Sugar 0.445 0.281 69,402
Instant coﬀee 0.485 0.297 88,194
Instant coﬀee 0.483 0.294 86,038
Salt 0.432 0.293 78,287
Salt 0.483 0.298 73,600
Worcestershire sauce 0.477 0.301 68,126
Hot sauce 0.461 0.293 87,770
Vinegar 0.519 0.296 69,994
Cocoa 0.409 0.286 85,190
Cocoa 0.427 0.289 88,238
Chocolate 0.420 0.290 91,780
Bleach 0.407 0.287 104,528
Laundry detergent 0.423 0.300 99,832
Soap 0.427 0.289 103,171
Floor cleaner 0.423 0.290 87,201
Floor cleaner 0.392 0.288 101,034
Laundry softener 0.431 0.294 91,814
Hand cream 0.461 0.287 66,652
Deodorant 0.451 0.28 76,503
Facial soap 0.458 0.295 83,995
Shampoo 0.421 0.289 90,846
Napkins 0.470 0.292 59,758
Napkins 0.432 0.290 81,764
44Table 4: Wal-Mart’s price distribution: Percentile Rank Summary Statistics
Good Mean Percentile Rank Std.Dev. N
Baby food 40.6 17.5 6,937
Tuna 29.4 21.2 4,225
Sugar 42.0 27.9 6,138
Bleach 34.3 20.5 6,931
Peas 48.8 25.2 6,725
Chiles 35.8 22.7 6,884
Chocolate 41.9 21.7 6,415
Hand cream 40.2 17.6 5,260
Deodorant 41.2 19.0 6,512
Laundry detergent 33.1 18.3 6,963
Peaches 36.2 19.8 6,549
Corn 45.4 19.2 6,610
Cookies 42.5 22.0 6,431
Corn ﬂour 38.9 18.5 6,546
Sugar cereal 34.1 15.8 6,784
Soup 32.2 23.4 6,660
Facial soap 30.2 18.7 5,090
Condensed milk 37.9 15.6 5,916
Evaporated milk 14.8 16.6 4,823
Ultrapasteurized milk 14.0 12.4 6,857
Lard 45.3 19.3 6,647
Jam 39.8 20.0 6,965
Pasta for soup 46.6 19.0 6,869
Tomato puree 36.1 18.9 6,857
Worcestershire sauce 20.3 13.3 6,498
Hot sauce 41.4 13.8 6,490
Shampoo 32.2 20.3 6,926
Laundry softener 36.5 17.0 6,860
Corn tortilla 35.7 16.2 6,086
Vinegar 32.3 17.0 6,795
Yoghurt 30.5 17.9 6,975
Corn oil 38.7 20.8 6,672
Mixed vegetable oil 31.7 21.1 5,136
Canola oil 39.1 22.0 6,969
Instant coﬀee (100 gr.) 35.1 27.5 6,490
Instant coﬀee (200 gr.) 33.9 27.1 6,295
Bread (Bimbo) 46.6 17.3 6,709
Bread (Wonder) 41.3 18.5 5,639
Salt (bag) 40.0 22.5 6,102
Salt (box) 33.4 19.3 5,965
Napkins (LYS) 40.3 20.0 206
Napkins (Petalo) 57.2 20.1 6,628
Cocoa (bag) 41.5 20.7 6,639
Cocoa (can) 36.7 20.8 6,741
Floor cleaner (Maestro) 38.6 17.9 5,648
Floor cleaner (Pinol) 37.8 20.8 6,855
45Table 5: Frequency of price changes at Wal-Mart and other retailers: Cox
Proportional Hazards Model, reporting coeﬃcient for hazard ratio of Wal-
Mart dummy, Part 1
Product Hazard ratio Hazard ratio Hazard ratio N
of price change of price decrease of price increase
Corn ﬂour 0.902∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗ 0.901∗∗ 82,707
(0.031) (0.045) (0.042)
Corn tortilla 1.687∗∗∗ 1.828∗∗∗ 1.568∗∗∗ 70,247
(0.052) (0.081) (0.068)
Bread (Bimbo) 0.962 0.955 0.967 93,827
(0.030) (0.046) (0.040)
Bread (Wonder) 1.088∗∗∗ 1.164∗∗∗ 1.030 68,332
(0.036) (0.056) (0.046)
Pasta for soup 0.893∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 104,236
(0.028) (0.041) (0.037)
Cookies 1.217∗∗∗ 1.232∗∗∗ 1.204∗∗∗ 78,027
(0.031) (0.046) (0.043)
Sugar Cereal 0.879∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 82,083
(0.030) (0.044) (0.041)
Tuna 0.984 0.944 1.018 68,719
(0.036) (0.052) (0.051)
Evaporated milk 0.690∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.782∗∗∗ 89,014
(0.028) (0.038) (0.041)
Condensed milk 0.882∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.97 79,472
(0.039) (0.055) (0.053)
Yoghurt 1.170∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗ 1.146∗∗∗ 88,651
(0.031) (0.044) (0.043)
Pasteurized milk 0.452∗∗∗ 0.353∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 98,694
(0.026) (0.036) (0.037)
Corn oil 1.066∗∗ 1.043 1.088∗∗ 73,024
(0.030) (0.042) (0.042)
Mixed oil 0.988 1.014 0.965 92,895
(0.029) (0.042) (0.039)
Canola oil 0.892∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 106,749
(0.023) (0.033) (0.032)
Lard 1.126∗∗∗ 1.147∗∗∗ 1.110∗∗ 83,973
(0.037) (0.056) (0.050)
Corn 1.582∗∗∗ 1.676∗∗∗ 1.501∗∗∗ 81,281
(0.046) (0.070) (0.061)
Chiles 0.922∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 105,185
(0.025) (0.036) (0.035)
Tomato puree 1.175∗∗∗ 1.226∗∗∗ 1.130∗∗∗ 75,710
(0.038) (0.057) (0.051)
Peas 1.295∗∗∗ 1.307∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 81,835
(0.042) (0.061) (0.057)
Baby food 1.035 1.032 1.037 104,699
(0.026) (0.038) (0.036)
Jam 0.730∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 0.744∗∗∗ 91,413
(0.028) (0.040) (0.038)
Peaches 1.412∗∗∗ 1.418∗∗∗ 1.406∗∗∗ 72,632
(0.035) (0.050) (0.049)
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
46Table 6: Frequency of price changes at Wal-Mart and other retailers: Cox
Proportional Hazards Model, reporting coeﬃcient for hazard ratio of Wal-
Mart dummy, Part 2
Product Hazard ratio Hazard ratio Hazard ratio N
of price change of price decrease of price increase
Sugar 1.149∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗∗ 1.082∗ 69,402
(0.033) (0.051) (0.044)
Instant coﬀee (small) 0.720∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.706∗∗∗ 88,194
(0.032) (0.049) (0.042)
Instant coﬀee (medium) 0.945 0.934 0.953 86,038
(0.039) (0.058) (0.052)
Salt 1.008 1.040 0.979 78,287
(0.035) (0.052) (0.049)
Salt 1.111 1.126 1.097 73,600
(0.042) (0.061) (0.058)
English sauce 0.946 0.894∗ 0.986 68,126
(0.038) (0.055) (0.051)
Hot sauce 0.593∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 87,770
(0.026) (0.039) (0.036)
Vinegar 0.767∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗ 69,994
(0.034) (0.050) (0.048)
Cocoa 1.113∗∗∗ 1.150∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗ 85,190
(0.030) (0.043) (0.041)
Cocoa 0.914∗∗∗ 0.917∗∗ 0.911∗∗ 88,238
(0.026) (0.037) (0.036)
Chocolate 0.865∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.849∗∗∗ 91,780
(0.027) (0.041) (0.037)
Bleach 0.849∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 104,528
(0.024) (0.035) (0.033)
Laundry detergent 0.916∗∗∗ 1.004 0.834∗∗∗ 99,832
(0.027) (0.041) (0.036)
Soap 1.052∗ 1.081∗ 1.025 103,171
(0.030) (0.044) (0.041)
Floor cleaner 0.817∗∗∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 87,201
(0.026) (0.037) (0.036)
Floor cleaner 0.828∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 101,034
(0.022) (0.032) (0.031)
Laundry softener 1.016 1.022 1.011 91,814
(0.031) (0.046) (0.043)
Hand cream 0.873∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗ 66,652
(0.033) (0.047) (0.047)
Deodorant 0.758∗∗∗ 0.748∗∗∗ 0.769∗∗∗ 76,503
(0.028) (0.0404) (0.040)
Facial soap 0.753∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗ 0.711∗∗∗ 83,995
(0.031) (0.047) (0.042)
Shampoo 1.032 1.069∗ 0.998 90,846
(0.027) (0.040) (0.037)
Napkins 0.574∗∗∗ 0.591∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 59,758
(0.067) (0.095) (0.093)
Napkins 0.999 0.959 1.035 81,764
(0.030) (0.043) (0.043)
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
47Table 7: Size of price changes: Summary statistics of absolute value of price
changes for Wal-Mart and non-Wal-Mart stores (in Mexican pesos)
Wal-Mart stores Non-Wal-Mart stores
Mean of absolute SD Mean of absolute SD
value of price change value of price change
Corn ﬂour 0.157 0.291 0.248 0.905
Corn tortilla 0.088 0.201 0.180 0.643
Bread (Bimbo) 0.273 0.558 0.360 0.720
Bread (Wonder) 0.320 0.659 0.402 0.774
Pasta for soup 0.075 0.164 0.151 0.248
Cookies 0.552 1.417 0.673 1.277
Sugar Cereal 0.560 1.205 0.811 1.985
Tuna 0.152 0.292 0.341 0.777
Evaporated milk 0.164 0.313 0.287 0.997
Condensed milk 0.143 0.612 0.274 1.340
Yoghurt 0.120 0.201 0.206 0.631
Pasteurized milk 0.124 0.226 0.482 4.707
Corn oil 0.301 0.684 0.413 0.886
Mixed oil 0.240 0.482 0.369 0.602
Canola oil 0.295 0.667 0.497 0.859
Lard 0.364 0.811 0.532 1.185
Corn 0.150 0.368 0.245 0.526
Chiles 0.156 0.302 0.254 0.459
Tomato puree 0.262 0.503 0.499 2.327
Peas 0.208 0.413 0.313 1.678
Baby food 0.212 0.391 0.233 0.721
Jam 0.207 0.607 0.482 0.983
Peaches 0.501 0.901 0.666 1.330
Sugar 0.265 0.616 0.413 0.900
Instant coﬀee (small) 0.238 0.679 0.485 1.295
Instant coﬀee (medium) 0.379 1.056 0.648 1.530
Salt 0.137 0.309 0.205 0.527
Salt 0.144 0.372 0.281 0.610
English sauce 0.23 0.719 0.456 1.115
Hot sauce 0.111 0.42 0.243 0.882
Vinegar 0.199 0.55 0.314 1.345
Cocoa 0.586 1.094 0.756 1.672
Cocoa 0.573 1.181 0.745 1.476
Chocolate 0.790 1.537 0.988 1.796
Bleach 0.188 0.498 0.384 1.674
Laundry detergent 0.261 0.576 0.548 1.424
Soap 0.113 0.210 0.221 0.509
Floor cleaner 0.372 0.844 0.593 1.016
Floor cleaner 0.325 0.711 0.622 1.121
Laundry softener 0.519 1.461 0.822 1.571
Hand cream 1.038 2.028 1.328 2.619
Deodorant 0.725 1.251 0.907 1.666
Facial soap 0.186 0.316 0.250 0.461
Shampoo 0.495 0.925 0.862 1.699
Napkins 0.423 0.845 0.365 0.934
Napkins 0.347 0.751 0.494 0.989
48Table 8: Inﬂuence of proximity to Wal-Mart and level of competition on
hazard of price changes by a non-Wal-Mart retailer, proportional Cox hazards
model
Hazard ratio Hazard ratio
of price increase of price decrease
Distance to closest Wal-Mart 0.998887∗∗∗ 0.998743∗∗∗
(0.000046) (0.000049)
Number of competitors in 3-mile radius 0.999710∗∗∗ 0.999573∗∗∗
(0.000027) (0.000028)
N 3,525,267 3,525,267
Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 9: Long-run equilibrium retail-wholesale price relationship, Dependent
variable is diﬀerence of retail price of each product
Mixed Veg. Oil Corn oil Tuna UHT Milk Yoghurt
Wholesale price 0.9366∗∗∗ 0.5465∗∗∗ 0.5883∗∗∗ 0.0400∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.048) (0.0097) 0.00219 (0.0006)
Time trend 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Constant 1.2054∗∗∗ 5.7973∗∗∗ 3.0169∗∗ 6.8892∗∗∗ 3.7791∗∗∗
(0.0365) (0.0468) (0.0451) (0.0308) (0.0079)
N 74,789 47,080 30,792 82,064 73,919
Store ﬁxed eﬀects are included.
Robust standard errors clustered by week in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
49Table 10: Error correction model with lagged adjustment, Dependent vari-
able is diﬀerence of retail price of each product
Mixed Vegetable oil Corn oil Tuna
4 Wholesale price (0) + −0.0024 0.1367∗∗∗ −0.0370
(0.0677) (0.0446) (0.0230)
4 Wholesale price (-1) + −0.0462 −0.0118 −0.0740∗∗
(0.0670) (0.0306) (0.0350)
4 Wholesale price (-2) + −0.1086 0.0227 −0.0684
(0.1148) (0.0307) (0.0424)
4 Wholesale price (-3) + −0.0381 −0.0004 −0.0501∗
(0.0538) (0.0262) (0.0303)
4 Wholesale price (-4) + 0.0439 0.05016∗ −0.0378
(0.1358) (0.0270) (0.0300)
4 Wholesale price (-5) + −0.0941 0.0490 −0.0930∗∗∗
(0.0605) (0.0455) (0.0269)
4 Wholesale price (-6) + −0.0542 0.0156 0.0145
(0.0757) (0.0279) (0.0359)
4 Wholesale price (0) − −0.0693 −0.0354 0.1459∗∗∗
(0.1371) (0.0995) (0.0193)
4 Wholesale price (-1) − −0.1727 −0.0003 −0.0360
(0.1089) (0.0542) (0.0466)
4 Wholesale price (-2) − −0.1684 −0.0196 −0.0343∗
(0.1398) (0.0938) (0.0193)
4 Wholesale price (-3) − −0.1730 0.0078 −0.0243
(0.1266) (0.0805) (0.0252)
4 Wholesale price (-4) − −0.0577 −0.0994 0.0459
(0.0871) (0.0684) (0.0386)
4 Wholesale price (-5) − 0.0095 −0.0301 0.0245
(0.1336) (0.0442) (0.0359)
4Wholesale price (-6) − −0.2414∗ 0.0625 0.0569∗∗∗
(0.1440) (0.0584) (0.0138)
Error correction term −0.2005∗∗∗ −0.1041∗∗∗ −0.1288∗∗∗
(0.0088) (0.0090) (0.0078
Time trend −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) 0.0001
Intercept 0.0343∗∗∗ −0.0191 −0.0194∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0159) 0.0068
N 30,114 15,213 18,115
R2 0.1063 0.0531 0.0679
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
50Table 11: Error correction model without lagged adjustment, Dependent
variable is diﬀerence of retail price of each product
Mixed Vegetable oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term −0.1674∗∗∗ −0.1031∗∗∗ −0.1258∗∗∗
(0.0068) (0.0020) (0.0075)
Time trend −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0027
(0.0062) (0.0048) (0.0079)
N 74,789 47,080 53,130
R-square 0.087 0.052 0.032
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
Table 12: Wal-Mart’s error correction model without asymmetry, Dependent
variable is diﬀerence of retail price of each product
Mixed Veg. Oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term −0.1679∗∗∗ −0.0987∗∗∗ −0.1282∗∗∗
(0.0066) (0.0021) (0.0077)
Wal-Mart dummy × ECT 0.0131 −0.1125∗∗∗ 0.0486∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0104) 0.0194
Time trend −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0347∗∗∗ 0.0128∗∗∗ 0.0039
(0.0061) (0.0048) (0.0080)
N 74,789 47,080 53,130
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
51Table 13: Wal-Mart’s asymmetric price adjustment is diﬀerent, error correc-
tion model where the dependent variable is diﬀerence in retail price of each
product
Mixed Veg. Oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term + −0.1280∗∗∗ −0.0647∗∗∗ −0.1993∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0116) (0.0167)
Wal-Mart × ECT + −0.6463∗∗∗ −0.2849∗∗∗ −0.0706
(0.1502) (0.0686) (0.0867)
Error correction term − −0.2361∗∗∗ −0.1734∗∗∗ −0.0150
(0.0146) (0.0132) (0.0190)
Wal-Mart × ECT − 0.0735∗∗∗ −0.0348 0.0307∗
(0.0178) (0.0326) (0.0159)
Time trend −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0348∗∗∗ 0.0543∗∗∗
(0.0071) (0.0120) (0.0126)
N 74,789 47,080 24,023
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
ECT + refers to a positive value of the error correction term or downward price adjustment;
ECT − refers to a negative value of the error correction term or upward price adjustment
52Table 14: Inﬂuence of proximity to Wal-Mart on price adjustment speed,
error correction model where dependent variable is diﬀerence of retail price
of each product
Mixed Veg. Oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term + −0.1349∗∗∗ −0.0564∗∗∗ −0.1929∗∗∗
(0.00793) (0.0032) (0.0149)
Distance to closest Wal-Mart × ECT + 0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.0008
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0006)
Error correction term − −0.2318∗∗∗ −0.1865∗∗∗ −0.0069
(0.0154) (0.0053) (0.0181)
Distance to closest Wal-Mart × ECT − 0.0000 0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0005
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Time trend −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0023 −0.0378∗∗∗ 0.0539∗∗∗
(0.0073) (0.0061) (0.0128)
N 72,632 41,664 23,332
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
ECT + refers to a positive value of the error correction term or downward price
adjustment; ECT − refers to a negative value of the error correction term or upward
price adjustment
53Table 15: Inﬂuence of level of competition on price adjustment speed, er-
ror correction model, dependent variable is diﬀerence of retail price of each
product
Mixed Veg. Oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term + −0.1150∗∗∗ −0.0883∗∗∗ −0.1816∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0046) 0.0297
Number of competitors in 3-mile radius × ECT + −0.0001 0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0000) 0.0002
Error correction term − −0.2052∗∗∗ −0.1857∗∗∗ −0.0159
(0.01630) (0.0075) 0.0225
Number of competitors in 3-mile radius × ECT - −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Time trend −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Constant 0.0034 −0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0551∗∗∗
(0.0072) (0.0057) (0.01289)
N 74,201 46,608 23,759
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
ECT + refers to a positive value of the error correction term or downward price
adjustment; ECT − refers to a negative value of the error correction term or upward
price adjustment
54Table 16: Wal-Mart’s price adjustment compared to other hypermarkets,
error correction model, dependent variable is diﬀerence of retail price of each
product
Mixed Vegetable oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term + −0.3085∗∗∗ −0.1697∗∗∗ −0.2981∗∗∗
(0.0708) (0.0083) (0.0877)
Wal-Mart dummy × ECT + −0.4551∗∗∗ −0.2328∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.1479) (0.0274) (0.1143)
Error correction term − −0.3266∗∗∗ −0.2337∗∗∗ −0.1434∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0184) (0.0666)
Wal-Mart dummy × ECT − 0.1429∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗ 0.2019∗∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0200) (0.0453)
Time trend 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Constant −0.0531 0.0634∗∗∗ 0.1144∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0129) (0.4912)
N 11,787 9,694 3,818
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
ECT + refers to a positive value of the error correction term or downward price
adjustment;
ECT − refers to a negative value of the error correction term or upward price adjustment
55Table 17: Inﬂuence of store’s neighborhood’s demographics on price adjust-
ment speed, error correction model with dependent variable as diﬀerence of
retail price of each product
Mixed Vegetable oil Corn oil Tuna
Error correction term + −0.14651∗∗∗ 0.01344∗∗∗ −0.13161∗∗∗
(0.02966) (0.06901) (0.02949)
ECT + × % of households with a refrigerator −0.05120 −0.07303 −0.00358
(0.03943) (0.05947) (0.05552)
ECT + × % of households that owns a PC 0.06550 0.05437 −0.08411
(0.06513) (0.06985) (0.08581)
ECT + × % of households with small children 0.24880 −0.16396 −0.66307∗∗
(0.26133) (0.35845) (0.27653)
Error correction term − −0.28016∗∗∗ −0.08883 0.07886∗∗∗
(0.04256) (0.02746) (0.02917)
ECT − × % of households with a refrigerator −0.05558 −0.04619 −0.08137∗∗∗
(0.03787) (0.03715) (0.03526)
ECT − × % of households that owns a PC 0.12701∗∗ −0.08684 0.039081
(0.05929) (0.06603) (0.060596)
ECT − × % of households with small children −0.00189 −0.57964∗∗∗ −0.23436
(0.25505) (0.21044) (0.18711)
Time trend −0.00189∗∗∗ −0.00097 0.00011
(0.00053) (0.00099) (0.00008)
Intercept 0.01103 −0.06744∗∗∗ 0.05942∗∗∗
(0.00904) (0.01376) (0.01203)
N 53,170 28,140 15,351
Testing for joint signiﬁcance of all demographic interaction terms
F statistic 1.15 2.86 4.15
Prob(F > Fc) 0.3339 0.0105 0.0008
Robust standard errors clustered by time in parenthesis
∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
ECT + refers to a positive value of the error correction term or downward price
adjustment; ECT − refers to a negative value of the error correction term or upward
price adjustment
56